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ABSTRACT   Does the Presidency of the Council of the European Union have the ability to 
direct the political attention of this body by emphasising and de-emphasising policy issues 
according to its own priorities? This study examines this question empirically by relying on a 
new dataset on the monthly meeting duration of Council working parties in different policy 
areas between 1995 and 2014. The results of variance component analyses show that a 
considerable part of the over-time variation in the relative amount of political attention 
devoted to a policy area is systematically related to different Presidency periods. While not 
negating the constraints imposed on the Presidency by inherited agendas, programming, and 
coordination requirements with other actors, the findings are consistent with the view that the 
Presidency has substantial scope for agenda-setting by determining what issues are being 
discussed, when they are being discussed, and how much time is devoted for their discussion. 
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The lack of continuity witnessed between Presidencies can be seen in the temptation 
experienced by each Presidency to stamp their particular priorities on the Union 
during their stewardship.  
Javier Solana, June 2001
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THE POWERS OF THE COUNCIL PRESIDENCY 
Does the institution of the Presidency provide member states with an opportunity to yield 
disproportionate influence over decision-making in the Council of the European Union? 
What powers does the Presidency have at its disposal to influence the process and outcome of 
Council negotiations? Being in charge of convening and chairing meetings at all levels of the 
Council’s organisational structure, the Presidency might be able to affect decision-making by 
setting the policy agenda. However, several observations support a sceptical view about the 
Presidency’s extent of agenda-setting power: being dependent on the Commission to initiate 
legislation, the Presidency does not have strong formal institutional proposal making powers, 
it is only in office for six months, it inherits much of the agenda of its predecessors, it is 
expected to comply with a norm of neutrality, and it often has to react to unforeseen external 
events or drawn-out crises that require immediate action. In more recent years, the 
introduction of programming across several Presidency terms has potentially added further 
constraints (Batory and Puetter 2013).  
Yet recent empirical studies have challenged this negative assessment of the 
Presidency’s agenda-setting power. In these studies, two distinct uses of the term ‘agenda-
setting power’ have to be distinguished. The first use of the term refers to agenda-setting 
power as the power to influence decision-making outcomes through privileged suggestions 
regarding the content of new policy. Most of the recent empirical research has focused on this 
type of agenda-setting power (Aksoy 2010; Schalk et al. 2007; Tallberg 2008; Thomson 
2008; Warntjen 2008). I refer to this type of power as proposal-making power. The 
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Presidency has special prerogatives when it comes to suggesting amendments to the 
Commission proposal. By exploiting the possibility that not all member states have to agree 
to its proposal under the qualified majority rule, and its access to privileged information 
about member states’ preferences and possible outcome options, the Presidency has the 
potential to present acceptable ‘compromise’ proposals that move the final negotiation 
outcome closer to its own favoured policy.  
The second use of the term refers to agenda-setting power as the power to influence the 
allocation of the Council’s political attention over specific policy issues by distributing 
limited time and space resources for meetings. I refer to this type of power as the 
Presidency’s scheduling power. During its half-year term, the Presidency organises the 
Council’s work. The Presidency decides who meets for how long and when. Meetings at all 
levels of the Council’s organisational hierarchy are convened by the Presidency. The 
Presidency does not only determine the timing and length of working party, committee, and 
ministerial meetings, but also the content of discussions. By drafting the agenda of meetings 
and by chairing them, the Presidency decides whether a topic will be discussed and how 
much meeting time will be spent on discussing it. Little empirical research has focused on the 
effects of the Presidency’s scheduling power (Tallberg 2003; Warntjen 2007; Warntjen 
2013a; Warntjen 2013b), even though the allocation of attention to a certain policy problem 
logically precedes and therefore serves as a precondition for any influence on the content of 
decision-making outcomes. As further elaborated below, the two types of agenda-setting 
power are the result of distinct activities, which differ in their sources of authority, 
motivations, and causal mechanisms.  
In empirical terms, the study is exclusively concerned with the Presidency’s scheduling 
power. In particular, the study addresses the question about the extent to which the 
Presidency has the power to emphasise or de-emphasise the attention devoted by the Council 
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to certain policy issues. To clarify the research objective, the study first develops a 
conceptual framework that is based on insights from Tallberg’s (2003) discussion of the 
Presidency’s agenda-shaping powers and Jones and Baumgartner’s (2005) general theoretical 
approach to the study of policy agendas and the allocation of political attention. In line with 
the Jones and Baumgartner’s (2005) view, the Council can be seen as being continuously 
confronted with a potentially infinite number of public and political demands. Yet like other 
political institutions, it holds only a limited capacity for organisational information 
processing. In such a high-information environment, the Presidency’s scheduling power acts 
as a filter to determine the allocation of the Council’s scarce time and space resources to 
attend to a selective number of issues. As special cases, the Presidency’s scheduling power 
includes the complete inclusion of previously latent issues on and the complete exclusion of 
previously salient issues from the agenda; but most of the time, the level of attention granted 
to an issue by the Presidency will be a matter of degree.
2
 Of course, the mere existence of 
scheduling power does not necessarily mean that governments use that power to 
disproportionally progress their own favoured issues. Almost by definition, the Presidency’s 
filtering of external demands will lead to disproportionate and biased allocation of attention, 
but whether and to what extent this bias will favour the progression of the Presidency’s own 
priorities is ultimately an empirical question.  
To shed more light on this matter, I employ a novel dataset of political attention in the 
Council based on the date and duration of working party meetings in different policy sectors 
between 1995 and 2014. Given large obstacles in creating a valid and reliable measure of 
Presidency priorities over such an extensive period of time and range of policy areas, I do not 
perform some form of correlational analysis, but restrict the empirical analysis to a test of an 
observable implication of the scheduling power argument about the over-time variation in the 
relative level of attention directed at a policy area. In particular, I conduct a variance 
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component analysis of the time-series data of political attention for each individual policy 
sector. These analyses assess whether and to what extent changes in the relative duration of 
working party meetings over time coincide with changes in the country holding the 
Presidency. Although passing such a ‘hoop test’ does not provide very strong positive support 
for the scheduling power argument, failing it is sufficient to credibly reject it. The results 
demonstrate that in almost all policy areas, Presidency periods account for a considerable 
amount of variation in the time-series. In addition, the relative and absolute effects for 
Presidency periods are also of substantive size.  
SCHEDULING VS. PROPOSAL MAKING POWER 
The Presidency of the Council lacks any major formal rights that would lead us to expect that 
it has a strong influence on the process and outcome of Council decision-making. Neither the 
treaties nor the Council’s rules of procedure provide the Presidency with exclusive rights to 
schedule meetings, determine agendas, or suggest amendments to the Commission’s proposal 
(Warntjen 2006). On the contrary, the treaties guarantee that Council meetings can be 
convened at the request of any one member state or even at the request of the Commission.
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Also, the Council’s rules of procedure specify that any member state or the Commission can 
demand the inclusion of an item on the Council’s agenda.4 Finally, the formal rules do not 
specify any distinct proposal or amendment rights for the Presidency, implying that it does 
not enjoy any special prerogatives in that respect.  
Indeed, the Council’s rules of procedure are generally silent on the conduct of 
meetings. Even the general rule that all meetings of Council bodies are to be chaired by the 
Presidency can only be derived from the explicit definition of exceptions in the Council’s 
rules of procedure. However, the absence of formal rules does not mean that Council 
negotiations are not subject to informal norms and role expectations. In the case of the 
Council, participants generally accept that it is the task of the Presidency to manage the 
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conduct of meetings and organise debate. To aid the timely and successful conclusion of 
negotiations, the Presidency is also supposed to act as a broker between disagreeing factions. 
Providing compromise proposals that are able to reconcile the interests of those factions is a 
major instrument to ensure an efficient outcome of negotiations. Yet, the Presidency might 
also be able to move the final negotiations outcome closer to its own preferred policy position 
by suggesting compromise proposals that favour its own views. An informal norm of 
neutrality is supposed to counter-act such tendencies (e.g. Niemann and Mak 2010). The 
Presidency is expected to be ‘neutral and impartial’ (Council 2006: 14). The common 
practice of splitting the roles of Presidency chairperson and national government 
representative amongst different delegates from the Presidency member state aids the 
maintenance of this norm.  
However, if the Presidency’s proposals appear too biased and threaten to lead to 
negotiation outcomes that unfairly disadvantage some member states, those member states 
might decide to offer alternative compromise proposals. The Presidency’s compromise 
proposal may act as a focal point as long as it is perceived to be fair or as long as the chances 
of success of a counter-offer are marginal. In other words, the Presidency’s proposal-making 
power is conditional on the Presidency either being able to exploit informational asymmetries 
about the real policy positions of member states or possible outcome options, or on satisfying 
a sufficiently large number of member states so that alternative proposals will not be able to 
sway support. Thus, the Presidency’s proposal-making power is far from absolute. The 
question is not whether the Presidency can influence negotiation outcomes in its favour at all, 
but to what extent it is able to do so and under what conditions.  
With regard to the Presidency’s scheduling power, the formal rules are more explicit. In 
contrast to the almost complete silence of formal rules on the role of the Presidency in 
leading the conduct of negotiations, the organisation of meetings and agendas receives 
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considerable attention in the Council’s rules of procedure.5 The rules of procedure outline the 
duties of the Presidency to develop indicative timetables (Art. 1.2) and agendas for each 
ministerial meeting (Art. 3.1) well in advance of its term in office. This formal requirement of 
long-term programming seems to stand in partial contradiction to the requirement to convene 
meetings at the request of individual member states or the Commission. If member states or 
the Commission made frequent use of this right, sensible long-term programming would be 
impossible. Given these conflicting formal norms, it is not surprising that an informal norm 
has developed that acknowledges the prerogative of the Presidency to determine meeting 
schedules of the Council. As the Presidency Handbook of the Council Guide (Council 2006: 
20) states, ‘the Presidency examines the other delegations' requests and comments carefully 
but it is accepted that, since it is in charge of organising work, it is the Presidency which 
determines the timetable’. Indeed, the prerogative of the Presidency to schedule meetings and 
set agenda topics at least partly according to its own priorities is not affected by the norm of 
neutrality, which mainly relates to the conduct of negotiations:  
The duty to be neutral exists alongside the political dimension which informs the 
conduct of Union business and which is particularly apparent in the order of priority 
set in the choice and handling of items of business. This order of priority is occasioned 
by considerations of topicality and of deadlines, as well as by the political tone which 
the Presidency wishes to set for its six-month period. (Council 2006: 14)  
From a purely practical point of view, the ability to programme the Council’s work over a 
number of months in advance is necessitated by the need to ensure the availability of the 
required meeting rooms and interpreters. Of course, just like the Presidency’s proposal 
power, its scheduling power is also conditional and subject to a potential override by other 
member states or the Commission. In the last resort, the formal rules that each member state 
or the Commission can request a meeting of the Council and the inclusion of specific items 
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on the agenda stands and can be referred to by those actors to enforce their will. However, 
given the normative and practical constraints, the cost of interference with the Presidency’s 
organisation of the Council’s work is high. In addition, the six-monthly rotation of the 
Presidency ensures that any issue another member state or the Commission would like to see 
discussed is blocked from the agenda at most temporarily. Thus, the costs of forcing an issue 
on the agenda or convening an additional meeting are considerable, while the potential 
benefits are small. Table 1 summarises the conceptual discussion so far. 
Table 1 Proposal-making vs. scheduling power 
 Proposal-making power Scheduling power 
Source Informal amendment rules Formal and informal scheduling rules 
Goal Implementation of policy preferences Implementation of policy priorities 
Means Making compromise proposals Allocation of time and meeting space 
 
The Presidency’s proposal-making and scheduling power differ according to their source of 
authority, the goal with which the Presidency employs them, and the practical means to 
achieve them. Proposal-making power is not supported by formal rules, but rests on tradition, 
convention, and informal norms that grant the Presidency’s proposals an elevated status. In 
contrast, the rules of procedure clearly specify the duty of the Presidency to organise the 
meetings and agendas of the Council. Thus, the Presidency’s scheduling power rests on a 
comparatively firmer footing than its proposal-making power, even if other formal rules 
partly contradict it. The two powers also differ clearly in the pursuit of the type of goal for 
which they might be employed. The exercise of proposal-making power might be used to bias 
the outcome of decision-making in favour of the Presidency’s policy preferences. The 
exercise of scheduling power might be used to progress discussions on some policy issues at 
the expense of others in line with the Presidency’s priorities. In contrast to a bias in 
distributive decision-making outcomes, the differential progression of policy issues does not 
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necessarily lead to obvious winners and losers. Thus, the consequences of exercising 
scheduling power are generally more benign and less likely to incite counter-acting reactions 
by other member states or the Commission. As a result, the pursuit of particular priorities by 
the Presidency is considered legitimate, whereas the pursuit of particular preferences is not. 
Finally, proposal-making power and scheduling power differ in the practical means through 
which they are executed. Proposal-making power relies on the Presidency making proposals 
to find a compromise between disagreeing coalitions. Scheduling power works through the 
allocation of scarce time and meeting space resources. 
EXISTING RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Although the consequences of the Presidency’s scheduling power are likely to be more 
pronounced and visible, most recent research has focused on the consequences of its 
proposal-making power. Schalk et al. (2007), Tallberg (2004), Thomson (2008), and 
Warntjen (2008) find that holding the Presidency at the time when a decision is adopted 
increases a country’s influence on policy outcomes. Aksoy (2010) concludes that holding the 
Presidency during European Union (EU) budget and financial perspective negotiations 
increases the share of money received by a country. Only Arregui and Thomson (2009) 
suggest that the influence of the Presidency might have waned with the increase in the 
number of member states in 2004. All in all, most existing research finds that the Presidency 
confers some additional influence on member states, even though its effects seem to be rather 
modest in size (Aksoy 2010; Arregui and Thomson 2009; Thomson 2008).
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Despite the rather more favourable conditions for the Presidency to exercise scheduling 
power, little research has examined the extent to which the Presidency is able to emphasise or 
de-emphasise the attention devoted to different policy issues. Alexandrova and Timmermans 
(2013) study the consequences of Presidency priorities on the agenda of the European 
Council and Warntjen (2007) studies the effect of Presidency priorities on legislative 
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production in the area of environmental policy. Alexandrova and Timmermans find that 
“overall, holding the Presidency does not make a difference in the influencing of the agenda 
of the European Council” (2013: 328), but whether these findings generalise to the Council of 
the EU, where agenda space is less restricted, remains to be seen. In contrast, Warntjen 
(2007) observes a substantially large association between the salience attached to 
environmental issues by the government parties of the country holding the Presidency and the 
number of first reading Council decisions made in that policy area.  
Warntjen’s (2013b) interviews with practitioners also lend support to the notion that the 
Presidency plays an influential role in shaping the agenda of the Council in line with its own 
priorities, and that this power has not significantly waned as a result of the institutional 
changes introduced by the Lisbon treaty. Finally, Warntjen’s (2013a) case study of protracted 
Council decision-making on a set of particularly controversial legislative proposals in the 
area of Occupational Health and Safety shows how Presidencies that prioritized those issues 
were particularly successful in advancing the negotiations. Of particular relevance for the 
current study, his research demonstrates that the scheduling of additional meetings was one of 
the mechanisms relied upon by Presidencies to make progress on the legislative files. 
Building on these promising results, the current study examines a wider cross-sectoral 
domain, covering all policy areas, and a process (i.e. meeting time) rather than an outcome 
measure (e.g. legislative decisions or collective policy statements) of the Presidency’s 
scheduling power, which shortens the causal chain connecting priorities to the dependent 
variable and thus allows for a more direct empirical test. 
DATA AND METHOD 
To assess the distribution of the Council’s political attention, this study relies on a dataset of 
the timing and length of Council working party meetings between 1 January 1995 and 31 
December 2014. For the analysis, I aggregate the data about individual meetings to create a 
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measure of the overall duration of meetings in a particular policy area and month. The 
dependent variable used in the variance components analyses measures the percentage of 
meeting time in a particular policy area in relation to the total duration of meetings in a 
particular month. The statistical analysis examines whether the over-time development in the 
policy area time-series exhibits the type of variation implied by the scheduling power 
argument. 
Working parties consist of representatives of member state governments and the 
Commission at the level of officials. They scrutinize the details of a legislative proposal and 
usually come to an agreement on most of its provisions. Much of the legislative work of the 
Council takes place in those groups (Häge 2008; Häge 2013). Importantly, and in contrast to 
the more institutionalised timetable of ministerial meetings, whose frequencies hardly vary 
over time, the Presidency has considerable leeway in deciding to convene or not convene 
working party meetings. The process of allocating scarce meeting room and interpretation 
resources to working parties works like a distributed system with a central clearing unit.
7
 In 
close collaboration with the relevant unit of the Council’s General Secretariat, a single person 
in the Permanent Representation of the Presidency country is put in charge of the allocation 
of meeting rooms and interpreters. As the Council’s Presidency Handbooks (2006: 22) 
specifies, this central meeting coordinator acts ‘on behalf of the chairperson of Coreper [the 
Council’s Committee of Permanent Representatives], and on his or her authority’. In case the 
demand for meeting rooms or interpretation facilities exceeds supply, the person is 
‘empowered to notify the General Secretariat of the Presidency’s priorities’ and ‘must be able 
to negotiate with working party chairpersons and, if need be, arbitrate’. Months in advance of 
the start of the Presidency term, designated working party chairs submit requests for rooms 
and interpreters. Collectively, these requests generally exceed the extremely limited Council 
resources. Thus, the central meeting coordinator’s task is to align demand and supply. Over 
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time, the initial version of the working party timetable is continuously updated in light of new 
developments, not only before but throughout the term of the Presidency. 
The description of the meeting room allocation process makes two important points. 
First, a clear mechanism exists that links Presidency priorities causally to the allocation of 
scarce meeting room resources. In order to receive additional resources, working party chairs 
have to make a case for their demands, and an important criterion for the central coordinator 
in deciding about the allocation of resources in light of conflicting demands is their alignment 
with and achievement of the Presidency’s priorities. Second, this causal mechanism is short 
and direct. The Presidency has a relatively free hand in deciding about the scheduling of 
meetings, and one of the main decision criteria is its priorities. As a result of the short causal 
chain between the independent and dependent variable, a multitude of alternative 
explanations for the distribution of meeting room resources, and thus the Council’s political 
attention, are ruled out by design.
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The raw information for the dataset was provided by the General Secretariat of the 
Council in response to requests of access to documents. The spreadsheets supplied by the 
Council Secretariat list the dates, the time slots (‘am’ for morning, ‘pm’ for afternoon, and 
‘ev’ for evening), and the French titles of meetings in chronological order. In total, the 
original files include 78,959 meeting entries. Unfortunately, the spreadsheet entries are not 
confined to meetings of working parties proper, but contain details for all types of meetings 
taking place on Council premises. Also, no standardised titles are used to refer to individual 
working parties. Thus, the generation of the final data set involved several labour-intensive 
steps: First, I manually coded the titles of all working party meetings and dropped all non-
working party meeting entries, relying on several versions of the Council Secretariat’s 
official ‘List of Council preparatory bodies’ to identify the population of working parties and 
distinguish working party from other types of meetings. Second, I removed duplicate 
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observations and added separate observations for each working party taking part in a joint 
meeting with others. Third, I cross-validated the coding of working party titles in the meeting 
data by comparing it with information about a working party’s existence from the lists of 
Council preparatory bodies, which resulted in a number of corrections. Finally, I aggregated 
the data of individual working parties and their duration by month and policy area. Given that 
the original files report the duration of meetings in terms of half-day slots, the duration of 
working party meetings per month and policy area is measured in half-day units.  
In distinguishing policy areas, I followed the Council’s own categorisation scheme that 
it uses to structure its lists of preparatory bodies. This categorisation scheme corresponds to 
the different sectoral formations of the Council. At the beginning of the study period, the 
Council’s policy categorisation scheme referred to 19 policy areas. As a result of the merging 
of several Council formations in 2002, these 19 categories were reduced to 10. As far as the 
original categories refer to clearly distinguishable policy areas, I retain the original categories 
for the entire period. I only merge the area of ‘Information Society’ with 
‘Telecommunications’ and the area of ‘Industry’ with ‘Internal Market’. In both instances, 
the dividing line between areas is not very clear. In purely practical terms, such ambiguity 
makes it difficult to clearly allocate the meetings of working parties established after the 2002 
reform to one or the other of the original categories. The remaining original categories do not 
suffer from this problem. These choices led to a policy measure distinguishing 17 areas.
9
 The 
aggregation of the daily meeting duration data by policy area and month results in a panel 
dataset of 3,740 observations (220 months times 17 policy sectors) indicating the total 
monthly duration of working party meetings in a policy area.
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Examining the relationship between Presidency priorities and the Council’s political 
attention empirically generates a number of methodological challenges. At least when 
considering attention at the level of entire policy areas, the strategy of measuring it by the 
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aggregate duration of meetings in those areas should yield very valid results. However, it is 
less clear-cut how Presidency priorities can be measured in a meaningful manner. At first 
sight, published Presidency programmes seem to be the most direct and readily available 
source of information about Presidency priorities.
11
 However, those documents vary widely 
in their length, structure, style, and detail devoted to different policy areas. Given these 
systematic differences across documents, none of the currently popular content analysis 
methods based on counting the number of words or other text elements would yield 
comparable results.  
Given these difficulties, I pursue a less ideal but practically feasible approach that does 
not rely on the explicit measurement of Presidency priorities. I employ a variance component 
analysis to determine how much of the over-time variation in the relative duration of working 
party meetings in a certain policy area is due to systematic differences between Presidency 
periods. If the Presidency is a purely reactive actor, which is only following established 
schedules, responding to ongoing crises and more or less randomly occurring external events, 
then most of the variability in the time-series should be absorbed by a time trend or accounted 
for by seasonal effects and the error term. Presidency periods should account for little or no 
variability. In contrast, if the Presidency exercises scheduling power, then a considerable 
amount of the variability in the time-series should be related to the six-month periods of the 
rotating Presidency.  
One weakness of this approach is that any Presidency period effect might be the 
composite result of internally and externally induced priorities. In other words, the causal 
effect of internally induced priorities cannot be identified unambiguously and is possibly 
overstated. However, the extent to which environmental factors confound the results depends 
on the degree of their co-variation with six-month Presidency periods. Many external 
pressures last for a much shorter or much longer periods of time. Still, the analysis below can 
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best be described as a ‘hoop test’ (van Evera 1997: 31). The absence of a substantial 
Presidency period effect decisively rejects the scheduling power hypothesis; yet a finding of a 
substantial Presidency period effect does not provide very strong support for it. In practice, a 
research design can only be evaluated in comparison to feasible alternatives (Gerring 2011). 
Arguably, a variance component analysis that delivers a decisive negative test is more 
valuable than a correlational study with an at best imperfectly measured independent variable 
that leads to neither a credible rejection of the hypothesis in the case of a negative test result 
nor credible support in the case of a positive one.  
THE EFFECT OF PRESIDENCY PERIODS 
In the following, I investigate the sources of the over-time variation in the Council’s political 
attention through variance component analyses. I conduct a separate analysis for each policy 
sector, relying on the percentage of working party meeting time in that sector for a given 
month as an indicator of the relative allocation of attention to that area. The analysis is 
conducted separately for each time-series because variation over time across Presidency 
periods is the main dimension of interest, and the consistently large cross-sectional variation 
between policy areas would swamp out the comparatively small over-time variation in a 
pooled analysis. To account for medium- to long-term determinants of the Council’s political 
attention, I first de-trend each of the time-series.  
For the de-trending, I use a locally weighted scatter plot smoother (lowess). Being a 
non-parametric smoother that bases its predictions on data within a local window of the time-
series, lowess is quite flexible in following the ups and downs in the time-series. After visual 
inspection, I selected a value of 0.4 (or 40 per cent of the data) for the window bandwidth, 
which results in a reasonable amount of smoothing without over-fitting the time-series. 
Figure A1 in the online appendix shows the observed time-series for each policy area and the 
estimated time trend. Since the choice of bandwidth value is somewhat subjective and 
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arbitrary, I report replications of the entire analysis with bandwidth values varied by a factor 
of 2 (i.e. 0.2 and 0.8, respectively) in the online appendix as well. Not surprisingly, the 
detailed results of the analyses change, but the qualitative conclusion that Presidency periods 
account for a substantial amount of over-time variation in most policy areas remains stable 
even when a very small bandwidth of 0.2 is selected.After de-trending, the variance 
components for each time-series are estimated through a linear mixed effects regression 
model, including only an intercept in the fixed part of the model and effects for Presidency 
period as well as month of the year in the random part. For each policy area, the model takes 
the following form: 







for 𝑡 = 1,… , 220 months, 𝑝 = 1,… , 40 Presidency periods, and 𝑚 = 1,… , 11 months of the 
year.
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 In addition, the covariances amongst random effects and the error term are assumed to 
be zero. The dependent variable ‘attention’ consists of the de-trended percentage values of 
the total duration of working party meetings in the particular policy area. The fixed part of 
the model with the intercept α provides essentially an estimate of the grand mean of the time-
series. The random part of the model provides estimates for how much the time series values 
vary around that mean across different Presidency periods and different months of the year, 
respectively. The random effects for the month of the year are included because most time-
series indicate substantial seasonal patterns. The random effects allow for separate intercepts 
for each Presidency period and each month of the year. However, rather than estimating a 
separate coefficient for each of those intercepts as in fixed effects estimation, a single 
parameter for their distribution is estimated. In particular, the regression analyses estimate the 
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standard deviations of those intercepts around the grand mean. In addition, any variation not 
captured by Presidency periods and month of the year is supposed to be the result of random 
error.  
Effectively, each analysis assumes that the total variance around the grand mean can be 
decomposed into variability due to differences in Presidency periods, due to month of the 
year, and due to idiosyncratic fluctuations specific to a certain month (i.e. the error term). 
Variance components are computed by first squaring the estimated standard deviations of the 
random effects and the error term to arrive at variances. Adding up the variances gives us an 
estimate for the total variance in the time-series. Dividing the variance of an individual 
random effect or the error term by the total variance and multiplying the resulting proportion 
by 100 yields the respective variance component as a percentage of the total variance in the 
de-trended time-series.  
Figure 1 presents the substantive effect sizes of Presidency periods for different policy 
areas. The left panel presents the raw estimates of the standard deviations and the right panel 
expresses them in terms of percentages of the mean of the original (i.e. not de-trended) time-
series. Figure A2 in the online appendix plots fitted against observed values for each 
individual policy area time-series based on the regression estimates of the grand mean and 
these random effects for Presidency periods to further illustrate the effects. With the 
exception of Environment and possible Education, Youth, and Culture, the standard deviation 
estimates for Presidency periods are all of substantive size. The left panel shows that policy 
areas with the largest overall percentage of meeting duration tend to have the largest absolute 
fluctuations around the time trend, which is not very surprising. For example, the three areas 
with the largest percentage shares of working party meeting time, Foreign Affairs, General 
Affairs, and Justice and Home Affairs, also exhibit the largest standard deviations of 1.05, 
0.94, and 0.82 percentage points, respectively. At the other end of the spectrum, policy areas 
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with smaller shares of working party meeting time, like Transport, Budget, or Education, 




Given the large differences in the overall shares of working party meeting time across 
policy areas, effect sizes are more sensibly assessed and compared when expressed in relative 
terms. In the right panel of Figure 1, the standard deviations are given as percentages of the 
mean of the original time-series. At the upper end of the range of effect sizes, the panel 
indicates that Presidency periods are associated with average deviations of about 31% of the 
mean percentage in the area of Research, and 29% in the area of Telecommunications. With 
the exception of Environment (0%), Foreign Affairs (3%), Transport (5%), and Education, 
Youth and Culture (5%), all remaining policy areas show substantively large relative 
deviation values between 5% and 20%. 
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Finally, Figure 2 presents the relative size of variance components of Presidency 
periods, month of the year, and time-period specific fluctuations. Whereas Figure 1 is 
concerned with comparing effect sizes across policy areas, Figure 2 allows an evaluation of 
the relevance of different sources of variation within each policy area time-series. Most 
policy areas that, in relative terms, indicate a large relative standard deviation for Presidency 
period random effects in the right panel of Figure 1 also account for a larger part of the 
variance in the relative amount of attention devoted to a certain policy sector over time. In the 
area of Research, about 37% of the time-series variation is due to systematic differences 
across Presidency periods, followed by 29% in Telecommunications, 29% in Development, 
and 28% in Fisheries. With the exception of Environment (0%), Education, Youth, and 
Culture (6%), and Transport (10%), Presidency periods account for more than 10% of the 
variance in the time-series of all policy areas. 
 
Figure 2 Variance components estimates by policy area, 1995-2014 
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This paper assesses the scheduling power of the Presidency of the Council of the EU. 
Conceptually, the Presidency’s scheduling power is distinguished from its proposal-making 
power. While the latter is aimed at affecting the content of decision-making outcomes, the 
former is aimed at determining which issues receive more or less attention in the decision-
making process. While the Presidency’s proposal-making power has received considerable 
attention in recent years, its scheduling power has been largely neglected. To examine the 
Presidency’s ability to allocate the Council’s sparse time and meeting room resources 
according to its own priorities, this study analyses a new dataset with detailed information on 
the date and duration of Council working party meetings between the beginning of 1995 and 
the end of 2014. Using the monthly share of working party meeting time in a policy area as 
an indicator of political attention, the sector-specific variance components analyses 
demonstrate that a considerable part of the over-time changes in attention is due to systematic 
differences between Presidency periods.  
Presidency periods have a particularly large effect in Telecommunications, Research, 
Development, and Fisheries, where they account for about one third of the variability around 
the time trend. The effect sizes in the remaining policy areas are more moderate, but with the 
exception of Environment and Education, Youth and Culture, Presidency periods still account 
for at least 10% of the variability in the relative amount of attention devoted to a certain 
policy area. Thus, in general, the findings of the analysis refute the claim that the Presidency 
is unable to direct the Council’s political attention in line with its own priorities. Even though 
much of the Council’s agenda might be inherited, subject to medium-and long-term 
programming, reliant on coordination with other institutional actors like the EP or the 
Commission, or shaken up by unforeseen shocks and external developments (e.g. the 
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financial crisis), much of the variation in the Council’s political attention is systematically 
related to the rotation of the Council’s chairmanship. 
Because the empirical analysis is restricted to a test of an observable implication of the 
scheduling power argument about the over-time distribution in the dependent variable, it 
cannot deliver covariational support for the existence of a causal link between priorities and 
political attention. However, a recent qualitative study by Warntjen (2013a) provides such 
complementary evidence about the link between the two variables. Studying a protracted 
decision-making process in the area of Occupational Health and Safety involving 12 
Presidency periods, Warntjen’s extensively cross-validated qualitative coding of priorities is 
clearly associated with the number of working party meetings scheduled by the Presidency. 
Assessing the validity of his findings for a broader range of cases and across different policy 
areas is a promising task for future research. 
Indeed, the current study suggests that significant variation exists across policy areas in 
the degree to which the Presidency enjoys scheduling power. To some extent, these 
differences might well be quasi-mechanical consequences of differences in the overall level 
of activity across policy areas. Areas with a generally broad policy scope are less likely to 
experience large relative changes over time than areas with a generally narrow scope. 
Because areas with a broad policy scope (e.g. Foreign Policy) involve many constitutive 
issues, any increase in the emphasis of one issue (e.g. human rights) might be easily cancelled 
out by less emphasis on another one (e.g. international terrorism).  
Another, more substantive explanation concerns differences in the organisational 
structure of the Council. The number of working parties and their degree of specialisation 
varies considerably across policy areas. The area of Environment is an extreme example: a 
single working party deals with all ‘domestic’ environmental policy issues. Given its wide 
policy scope, the working party is essentially in constant session and, by convention, meets 
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on a weekly basis. In cases where meeting patterns are institutionalised to such a degree, the 
discretion of the Presidency to allocate additional or less meeting time to a working party is 
rather limited. Indeed, the fact that the analysis did not find a variance component associated 
with Presidency periods in the area of Environment lends some credence to this explanation. 
However, to come to firmer conclusions in this respect, future research needs to investigate 
the reasons for cross-policy variation in the Presidency’s scheduling power more thoroughly 
and in greater detail, both in theoretical and empirical terms.      
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 Council (2001) Report to the European Council: Preparing the Council for Enlargement. 
9518/01, 7 June, p.12. 
2
 Thus, the concept of scheduling power is related to but narrower than Tallberg’s (2003) 
concept of agenda-shaping power. Amongst Tallberg’s (2003) three ways in which 
Presidencies can shape the Council’s agenda, scheduling power coincides to a large extent 
with Tallberg’s ‘agenda-structuring’. However, the concept of scheduling power also 
includes the complete omission of issues from the agenda, which is part of Tallberg’s ‘agenda 
exclusion’, and the inclusion of new issues, which is part of Tallberg’s ‘agenda-setting’. 
3
 Art. 237 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (formerly Art. 204 
of the Treaty establishing the European Community [TEC]). 
4
 Art. 3.2 of the Council’s Rules of Procedure in Official Journal (2009) Council Decision of 
1 December 2009 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure (2009/937/EU). L325/35, 11 
December. 
5
 See previous footnote for source information. 
6
 Tallberg (2010: 252) provides further supporting examples. In contrast, Kleine (2013) 
suggests that the Presidency keeps proposals intentionally off the agenda whose content it 
would strongly like to shape in a certain direction, in order to be able to make credible 





view, the Presidency deliberately uses its scheduling power to alleviate fears by other 
member states that it might use its proposal-making power to their disadvantage. 
7
 Where not indicated otherwise, the following description is based on two interviews with 
central meeting coordinators of different Presidency countries on 19
th
 July 2012. 
8
 In particular, the short causal chain rules out alternative explanations that might affect 
alternative dependent variables based on measures of collective Council decisions (e.g. laws 
or policy statements), which are not under direct and immediate control of the Presidency, but 
depend on the actions of other actors. Of course, characteristics of the dossier under 
consideration (e.g. the complexity of the proposal, level of conflict, or deadlines) affect 
scheduling decisions as well, but given that it is difficult to prevent the Presidency from 
‘dragging its feet’ on issues that it does not want to pursue or from scheduling additional 
meetings on issues it deems important, they are at most mediating factors that may weaken (if 
the dossier is not a priority) or amplify (if the dossier is a priority) the relationship between 
priorities and attention. 
9
 The different areas are General Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Development, Budget, Economic 
and Financial Affairs, Justice and Home Affairs, Agriculture, Fisheries, Internal Market, 
Telecommunications, Energy, Research, Employment and Social Policy, Transport, 
Environment, Health and Consumer Policy, Education and Culture. 
10
 The month of August was dropped for all years and policy areas because of a negligible 
number of meetings due to the holiday season. 
11
 National manifesto data suffer from the same problems of comparability outlined in the 
text as Presidency programmes (e.g. Gemenis 2012). In addition, Party manifestos for 
national elections (Warntjen 2007) or national executive speeches outlining government 





not priorities for what the government would like to achieve as part of its half-year Council 
Presidency term at the EU level. Measures based on those sources might suffer less from 
endogeneity problems. Yet they are at best indirect proxies for the concept to be measured 
and, as such, are likely to be affected by systematic measurement error. Finally, speeches 
tend to be more selective than manifestos. Indeed, Presidency presentations of their work 
programmes to the European Parliament do not mention certain major topics at all (Warntjen 
2007). Therefore, the discussion in the text is focused on Presidency work programmes as the 
source most likely to produce valid priority data. 
12
 As explained above, the month of August has been dropped due to the lack of any 
significant meeting activity during that month. 
13
 See Table A1 in the online appendix for the complete numerical estimation results from the 
mixed effects regressions. 
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